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We present a technique for static enforcement of high-level, declarative information flow policies. Given a
program that manipulates sensitive data and a set of declarative policies on the data, our technique automati-
cally inserts policy-enforcing code throughout the program to make it provably secure with respect to the
policies. We achieve this through a new approach we call type-targeted program synthesis, which enables the
application of traditional synthesis techniques in the context of global policy enforcement. The key insight
is that, given an appropriate encoding of policy compliance in a type system, we can use type inference to
decompose a global policy enforcement problem into a series of small, local program synthesis problems that
can be solved independently.
We implement this approach in Lifty, a core DSL for data-centric applications. Our experience using the
DSL to implement three case studies shows that (1) Lifty’s centralized, declarative policy definitions make it
easier to write secure data-centric applications, and (2) the Lifty compiler is able to efficiently synthesize
all necessary policy-enforcing code, including the code required to prevent several reported real-world
information leaks.
1 INTRODUCTION
From social networks to health record systems, today’s software manipulates sensitive data in
increasingly complex ways. To prevent this data from leaking to unauthorized users, programmers
sprinkle policy-enforcing code throughout the system, whose purpose is to hide, mask, or scramble
sensitive data depending on the identity of the user or the state of the system. Writing this code is
notoriously tedious and error-prone.
Static information flow control techniques [Chlipala 2010; Jia and Zdancewic 2009; Li and
Zdancewic 2005; Myers 1999; Swamy et al. 2010; Zheng and Myers 2007] mitigate this problem
by allowing the programmer to state a high-level declarative policy, and statically verify the code
against this policy. These techniques, however, only address part of the problem: they can check
whether the code as written leaks information, but they do not help programmers write leak-free
programs in the first place. In this work, we are interested in alleviating the programmer burden
associated with writing policy-enforcing code.
In recent years, program synthesis has emerged as a powerful technology for automating tedious
programming tasks [Barowy et al. 2015; Feng et al. 2017; Gulwani 2011; Solar-Lezama et al. 2006;
Yaghmazadeh et al. 2017]. In this paper we explore the possibility of using this technology to
enforce information flow security by construction: using a declarative policy as a specification, our
goal is to automatically inject provably sufficient policy-enforcing code throughout the system.
Authors’ addresses: Nadia Polikarpova, University of California, San Diego, npolikarpova@eng.ucsd.edu; Jean Yang, Carnegie
Mellon University, jyang2@cs.cmu.edu; Shachar Itzhaky, Technion, shachari@cs.technion.ac.il; Travis Hance, Carnegie
Mellon University, thance@cs.cmu.edu; Armando Solar-Lezama, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, asolar@csail.mit.
edu.
2018. 2475-1421/2018/1-ART1 $15.00
https://doi.org/
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
03
44
5v
2 
 [c
s.P
L]
  2
2 M
ar 
20
18
1:2 Nadia Polikarpova, Jean Yang, Shachar Itzhaky, Travis Hance, and Armando Solar-Lezama
program
policies 
expected type
synth
synth
synth
expected type
expected type
patch
patch
patch
type
checker
Fig. 1. Policy enforcement in Lifty.
This approach seems especially promising, since each individual policy-enforcing snippet is usually
short, side-stepping the scalability issues of program synthesizers.
The challenge, however, is that our setting is significantly different from that of traditional
program synthesis. Existing synthesis techniques target the generation of self-contained functions
from end-to-end specifications of their input-output behavior. In contrast, we are given a global
specification of one aspect of the program behavior: it must not leak information. This specification
says nothing about where to place the policy-enforcing snippets, let alone what each snippet is
supposed to do.
Type-targeted program synthesis. In this paper we demonstrate how to bridge the gap between
global policies and local enforcement via a new approach that we call type-targeted program synthesis.
Our main insight is that a carefully designed information flow type system lets us leverage type
error information to infer local, end-to-end specifications for policy-enforcing leak patches. More
specifically, (1) the location of a type error indicates where to insert a patch and (2) its expected type
corresponds to the local specification for the patch. A crucial property of local specifications is that
any combination of patches that satisfy their respective local specifications yields a provably secure
program. In other words, type-targeted synthesis decomposes the problem of policy enforcement
into several independent program synthesis problems, which can then be tackled by state-of-the-art
synthesis techniques.
Type system. The main technical challenge in making type-targeted synthesis work is the design
of a type system that, on the one hand, is expressive enough to reason about the policies of interest,
and on the other hand, produces appropriate type errors for the kinds of patches we want to
synthesize. For our policy language, we draw inspiration from Jeeves [Austin et al. 2013; Yang et al.
2012], which supports rich, context-dependent policies, where the visibility of data might depend
both on the identity of the viewer and the state of the system. For example, in a social network
application, a user’s birth date can be designated visible only to their friends (where the list of
friends can be updated over time). In Jeeves, these policies are expressed directly as predicates over
users and states. Our technical insight is that static reasoning about Jeeves-style policies can be
encoded in a decidable refinement type system by indexing types with policy predicates. Moreover,
we show how to instantiate the Liquid Types framework [Rondon et al. 2008] to infer appropriate
expected types at the error locations.
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Fig. 2. Author’s home screen in EDAS, shared with permission of Agrawal and Bonakdarpour [Agrawal and
Bonakdarpour 2016].
The Lifty language. Based on this insight, we developed Lifty1, a core DSL for writing secure data-
centric applications. In Lifty, the programmer implements the core functionality of an application
as if all data were publicly visible. Separately, they provide a policy module, which associates
declarative policies with some of the fields (columns) in the data store, by annotating their types
with policy predicates. Given the source program and the declarative policies, Lifty automatically
inserts leak patches across the program, so that the resulting code provably adheres to the policies
(Fig. 1). To that end, Lifty’s type inference engine checks the source program against the annotated
types from the policy module, flagging every unsafe access to sensitive data as a type error. Moreover,
for every unsafe access the engine infers the most restrictive policy that would make this access
safe. Based on this policy, Lifty creates a local specification for the leak patch, and then uses a
variant of type-driven synthesis [Polikarpova et al. 2016] to generate the patch.
Evaluation. To demonstrate the practical promise of our approach, we implemented a prototype
Lifty-to-Haskell compiler. We evaluated our implementation on a series of small but challenging
micro-benchmarks, as well as three case studies: a conference manager, a health portal, and a
student grade record system. The evaluation demonstrates that our solution supports expressive
policies, reduces the burden placed on the programmer, and is able to generate all necessary patches
for our benchmarks within a reasonable time (26 seconds for our largest case study). Importantly,
the evaluation confirms that the patch synthesis time scales linearly with the size of the source code
(more precisely, with the number of required leak patches), suggesting the feasibility of applying
this technique to real-world code bases.
2 LIFTY BY EXAMPLE
To introduce Lifty’s programming model, type system, and the type-targeted synthesis mechanism,
we use an example based on a leak from the EDAS conference manager [Agrawal and Bonakdarpour
2016]. We have distilled our running example to a bare minimum to simplify the exposition of
how Lifty works under the hood; at the end of the section, we demonstrate the flexibility of our
language through more advanced examples.
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1 showPaper client p =
2 let row = do
3 t ← get (title p)
4 st ← get (status p)
5 ses ← if st = Accept
6 then get (session p)
7 else ""
8 t + " " + ses in
9 print client row
Fig. 3. Snippet of the core functionality of
a conference manager (in Lifty syntax).
1 showPaper client p =
2 let row = do
3 t ← get (title p)
4 st ← do x1 ← get phase
5 if x1 = Done
6 then get (status p)
7 else NoDecision
8 ses ← if st = Accept
9 then get (session p) else ""
10 t + " " + ses in
11 print client row
Fig. 4. With a leak patch inserted by Lifty.
2.1 The EDAS Leak
Fig. 2 shows a screenshot from the EDAS conference manager. On this screen, a user can see an
overview of all their papers submitted to upcoming conferences. Color coding indicates paper
status: green papers have been accepted, orange have been rejected, and yellow papers are awaiting
notification. The user is not supposed to learn the acceptance decision before the notifications are
out, yet from this screen they can infer that the first one of the yellow papers has been tentatively
accepted, while the second one has been tentatively rejected. They can make this conclusion
because the two rows differ in the value of the “Session” column (which displays the conference
session where the paper is to be presented), and the user knows that sessions are only displayed
for accepted papers.
The EDAS leak is particularly insidious because it provides an example of an implicit flow: the
“accepted” status does not appear anywhere on the screen, but rather influences the output via a
conditional. To prevent such leaks, it is insufficient to simply examine output values; rather, we
must track the flow of sensitive information through the system.
Fig. 3 shows a simplified version of the code that has caused this leak. This code retrieves the
title and status for a paper p, then retrieves session only if the paper has been accepted, and
finally displays the title and the session to the currently logged-in client. The leak happened
because the programmer forgot to insert policy-enforcing code that would prevent the true value of
status from influencing the output, unless the conference is in the appropriate phase (notifications
are out). It is easy to imagine, how in an application that manipulates a lot of sensitive data, such
policy-enforcing code become ubiquitous, imposing a significant burden on the programmer and
obscuring the application logic.
2.2 Programming with Lifty
Lifty liberates the programmer from having to worry about policy-enforcing code. Instead, they
provide a separate policy module that describes the data layout and associates sensitive data with
declarative policies. For example, Fig. 5 shows a policy module for our running example.
The Lifty type system is equipped with a special type constructor ⟨T ⟩π (“T tagged with policy
π ”), where π : (Σ, User) → Bool is a predicate on output contexts, i.e. pairs of stores and users. The
type ⟨T ⟩λ(s,u).p denotes values of typeT that are only visible to a useru in a store s such that p holds.
1Lifty stands for Liquid Information Flow TYpes.
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module ConfPolicy where
data Status = Accept | Reject | NoDesicion
redact NoDecision
title :: PaperId → Ref ⟨String⟩λ_.⊤
status :: PaperId → Ref ⟨Status⟩λ(s,u).s[phase] = Done
session :: PaperId → Ref ⟨String⟩λ_.⊤
Fig. 5. Snippet from a policy module for a conference manager.
For example, to express that a paper’s status is only visible when the conference phase is Done, the
programmer defines its type as a reference to Status tagged with policy λ(s,u).s[phase] = Done.
Hereafter, we elide the binders (s,u) from policy predicates for brevity, and simply write λ.p. The
policy λ.⊤ annotates fields as public (i.e. visible in any context).
Given the code in Fig. 3 and the policy module, Lifty injects policy-enforcing code required to
patch the EDAS leak; the result is shown in Fig. 4 with the new code highlighted. This code guards
the access to the sensitive field status with a policy check, and if the check fails, it substitutes the
true value of status with a redacted value—a constant NoDecison. Lifty constructs redacted values
using a restricted set of functions, designated by the programmer via redact clauses in the policy
module (Fig. 5). Lifty guarantees that the patched code is provably correct with respect to the
policies in the policy module.
Even though in this example generating the policy check amounts to little more than copying
the policy predicate from the type declaration, this naive syntactic approach quickly breaks down
in more realistic scenarios. In particular, the policy might depend on the eventual viewer, the state
of the system might have changed in between the invocations of get and print, or there might be
multiple choices for constructing the redacted value. To be able to handle these scenarios, we opt
for a more general approach based on program synthesis.
2.3 Type-Targeted Program Synthesis
Can the code in Fig. 4—and its correctness proof—be synthesized using existing techniques?
Several existing synthesis systems [Kneuss et al. 2013; Polikarpova et al. 2016] provide correctness
guarantees, but they generate programs from scratch, from full functional specifications. In our
case, a full functional specification for showPaper is not available; in addition, re-synthesizing the
whole function from scratch will fail to scale to larger programs.
Prior approaches to sound program repair [Kneuss et al. 2015] use fault localization to focus
synthesis on small portions of the program responsible for the erroneous behavior. These existing
localization techniques, however, are insufficient in our setting. First, they are not precise enough,
i.e. they would fail to pinpoint get (status p) as the smallest unsafe term; to increase precision,
they rely on testing, which is hardly applicable to non-functional properties such as information
flow security. Second, they can only identify where to insert the patch, but cannot infer its local
specification; candidate patches are validated by re-checking the whole function, which leads to
a combinatorial explosion in the presence of multiple unsafe terms (a rare case in the context of
program repair, but quite common with the Lifty programming model).
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In this section we show how a careful encoding of information flow security into a type system
(Sec. 2.3.1) allows us to instead use type inference for precise fault localization (Sec. 2.3.2). Concretely,
type-checking the code in Fig. 3 against the policy module, leads to a type error in line 5, which
flags the term get (status p) as unsafe, and moreover, gives its expected type, which can be used
as the local specification for patch synthesis (Sec. 2.3.3).
2.3.1 Type System. The Lifty type system builds upon existing work on security monads [Russo
et al. 2008; Swamy et al. 2010], where sensitive data lives inside a monadic type constructor (in our
case, ⟨·⟩), parameterized by a security level; proper propagation of levels through the program is
ensured by the type of themonadic bind 2. In contrast with prior work, our security levels correspond
directly to policy predicates, which allows Lifty programs to express complex context-dependent
policies directly as types, instead of encoding them into an artificial security lattice.
Subtyping. Moreover, unlike prior work, Lifty features subtyping between tagged types, which is
contravariant in the policy predicate, i.e. ⟨T ⟩λ .p <: ⟨T ⟩λ .q iff q ⇒ p. This allows a “low” value (with
a less restrictive policy) to appear where a “high” value (with more restrictive policy) is expected,
but not the other way around. Lifty restricts the language of policy predicates to decidable logics;
hence, the subtyping between tagged types can be automatically decided by an SMT solver.
Tagged primitives. The type error for the EDAS leak is generated due to the typing rules for
primitive operations on tagged values, bind and print. Informally, the bind rule allows tagging
the result of a sequence of two tagged computations with any policy π that is as least as secret as
both computations. The print rule allows displaying messages tagged with any π that holds of the
current state and the viewer. We formalize these rules in Sec. 3.
Type inference. The Lifty type inference engine is based on the Liquid Types framework [Cosman
and Jhala 2017; Rondon et al. 2008]. As such, it uses the typing rules to generate a system of
subtyping constraints over tagged types, and then uses the definition of contravariant subtyping to
reduce them to the following system of Horn constraints over policy predicates:
B4 ⇒ s[phase] = Done (1)
B3 ⇒ B4 (2)
u = client ∧ s = σ ⇒ B3 (3)
where Bi are unknown policies of bind applications at line i (trivial constraints are omitted).
Specifically, (1) and (2) collectively state that the row computation must be at least as secret as the
status field, while (3) requires row’s policy to hold of the output context.
The Horn constraints are solved using a combination of unfolding and predicate abstraction. In
this case, however, the system clearly has no solution, since the consequent of (1) is not implied by
the antecedent of (3); in other words, the code is trying to display a sensitive value in a context
where its policy doesn’t hold.
2.3.2 Fault Localization. Unlike existing refinement type checkers [Cosman and Jhala 2017;
Rondon et al. 2008], Lifty is not content with finding that a type error is present: it needs to identify
the term to blame and infer its expected type. Intuitively, declaring constraint (3) as the root cause
of the error corresponds to blaming print for displaying its sensitive message in too many contexts,
while picking constraint (1), corresponds to blaming the access get (status p) for returning a
value that is too sensitive. For reasons explained shortly, Lifty always blames the access.
2Lifty’s Haskell-like do-notation used in Fig. 3 desugars into invocations of bind in a standard way [Marlow 2010] (see
Appendix A for the desugared version).
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
Enforcing Information Flow Policies
with Type-Targeted Program Synthesis 1:7
To infer its expected type, it has to find an assignment to B4, which works for the rest of the
program (i.e. is a solution to constraints (2)–(3)). This new system has multiple solutions, including
a trivial one [Bi 7→ ⊤]. The optimal solution corresponds to the least restrictive expected type,
in other words—due to contravariance—the strongest solution for policy predicates: [Bi 7→ u =
client ∧ s = σ ]. Substituting this solution into the subtyping constraint that produced (1), results
in the desired type error:
get (status p) :
expected type: ⟨Status⟩λ .u = client ∧ s = σ
and got: ⟨Status⟩λ .s[phase] = Done
Note that picking constraint (3) as the root cause instead, and inferring the weakest solution
to constraints (1)–(2) ([Bi 7→ s[phase] = Done]) conceptually would give rise to a different patch:
guarding the whole message row with a policy check. This would fix the leak but have an undesired
side effect of hiding the paper title along with the session. Data-centric applications routinely
combine multiple pieces of data with different policies in a single output; therefore, in this domain
it makes more sense to guard the access, which results in “redacting” as little data as possible3.
2.3.3 Patch Synthesis. From the expected type, Lifty obtains a type-driven synthesis prob-
lem [Polikarpova et al. 2016]:
Γ ⊢ ?? :: ⟨Status⟩λ .u = client ∧ s = σ
Here Γ is a typing environment, which contains a set of components—variables and functions that
can appear in the patch—together with their refinement types. A solution to this problem is any
program term t that type-checks against the expected type in the environment Γ. As we show in
Sec. 4, any such t , when substituted for get (status p) in Fig. 3, would produce a provably secure
program; hence the synthesis problem is local (can be solved in isolation).
Even though any solution is secure, not all solutions are equally desirable: for example, we
wouldn’t want the patch to return Accept unconditionally. Intuitively, a desirable solution returns
the original value whenever allowed, and otherwise replaces it with a reasonable redacted value.
Lifty achieves this through a combination of two measures. First, instead of synthesizing a single
term of type ⟨Status⟩π , it generates a set of candidate branches (by enumerating all branch-free
terms of this type up to a fixed size). Second, Lifty gives the programmer control over the set
of possible redacted values by generating the branches in a restricted environment, which only
contains the original term and the components explicitly designated by the programmer as redaction
functions (see Fig. 5 for an example). As a result, our running example generates only two branches:
get (status s) :: ⟨Status⟩λ .s[phase] = Done
NoDecision :: ⟨Status⟩λ_.⊤
Next, for every branch, Lifty attempts to abduce a condition that would make the branch type-
check against the expected type. In our example, the second branch is correct unconditionally,
while the first branch generates the following logical abduction problem:
C ∧ u = client ∧ s = σ ⇒ s[phase] = Done
where C is an unknown formula that cannot mention the policy parameters s and u. Lifty uses
existing techniques [Polikarpova et al. 2016] to find the following solution
C 7→ σ [phase] = Done.
3Lifty borrows this “redaction semantics” from Jeeves, which also enforces policies by replacing secret values in a
computation with public defaults, but does so via a specialized runtime (see a detailed comparison in Sec. 6).
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It then sorts all successfully abduced branch conditions from strongest to weakest, and uses each
condition to synthesize a guard, i.e. a program that computes the monadic version of the condition:
bind (get phase) (x1 . x1 = Done).
Finally, Lifty combines the synthesized guards and branches into a single conditional, which
becomes the patch and replaces the original unsafe access.
2.4 Scaling Up to Real-World Policies
In the rest of the section, we demonstrate more challenging scenarios, where (1) a function contains
several unsafe accesses, (2) the policy check itself uses sensitive data, and hence proper care must
be taken to ensure that policy-enforcing code does not introduce new leaks, (3) the redacted value
is not just a constant, or (4) the policy check depends on the eventual viewer and the state at the
time of output (which need not equal the state at the time of data retrieval). Full code for each of
these examples can be found in Appendix B.
2.4.1 Multiple Leaks. Consider a variant of our running example, where in addition to the
paper’s title and session, we display its authors. Also assume our conference is double-blind, so the
the authors field is only visible once notifications are out:
authors :: p : PaperId → Ref ⟨[User]⟩λ .s[phase] = Done
When checking this extended version of showPaper, Lifty generates two type errors, one for
get (status p) with expected type ⟨Status⟩π and one for get (authors p) with expected type
⟨[User]⟩π , where π ≡ λ.u = client ∧ s = σ in both cases, since both faulty terms flow into
the same print statement. This gives rise to two patch synthesis problems, which can be solved
independently, because their expected types only depend on the output context.
Note that Lifty is able to infer independent expected types for the two errors because the
correctness of this program depends only on policies of the faulty terms and not on their content.
This is a crucial property that enables local patch synthesis. We observe that, unlike in general
program repair, this assumption is reasonable in the context of policy enforcement for data-centric
applications (as confirmed by our evaluation).
2.4.2 Self-Referential Policies. Continuing with our extended example, assume that we want to
allow a paper’s author to see the author list even before the notifications are out. This is an example
of a policy that depends on a sensitive value; moreover, in this case the policy is self-referential: it
guards access to authors in a way that depends on the value of authors. Enforcing such policies
by hand is particularly challenging, because the policy check needs to retrieve and compute over
sensitive values, and hence, while trying to patch one leak, it might inadvertently introduce another.
In Lifty, the programmer expresses this complex policy in a straightforward way:
authors :: p : PaperId → Ref ⟨[User]⟩λ .s[phase] = Done ∨ u ∈s[authors p]
Given this policy, Lifty generates a provably correct patch:
auts ← do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
c2 ← ⌊do x2 ← get (authors p); elem client x2⌋
if c1 ∨ c2 then get (authors p) else []
The policy check c2 is wrapped in ⌊·⌋, Lifty’s novel safe downgrading construct. This construct
changes the tag on c2 from “visible to authors p” to “visible to client”, which is necessary for the
patched program to type-check. Lifty deems this downgrading safe because it can prove that c2
does not give client the power to distinguish between two author lists they are not allowed to
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see (since for any such list c2 evaluates to false). In Sec. 3 we formalize a security guarantee that
captures this kind of reasoning, and show how Lifty performs this reasoning automatically.
2.4.3 Nontrivial Patches. When sensitive data has more interesting structure, the optimal
redacted value can be more complex than just a constant. Consider the example of an auction
where bids are only revealed once all participants have bid [Russo et al. 2008]. Now consider a
more interesting policy: once a participant has bid and before all bids are fully revealed, they can
see who else has bid, but not how much. One way to encode this in Lifty is to store the bid in an
option type and associate different policies with the option and its content:
bid :: User → Ref ⟨Maybe ⟨Int⟩λ .s[phase] = Done⟩λ .s[bid u],∅ ∨ s[phase] = Done
(here data Maybe a = Nothing | Just a).
With this definition, Lifty generates the following patch inside a function showBid client p,
which displays participant p’s bid to client:
1 do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
2 if c1
3 then get (bid p)
4 else do c2 ← ⌊do x2 ← get (bid client); isJust x2⌋
5 if c2
6 then do x3 ← get (bid p); mbMap ( λ _ . 0) x3
7 else Nothing
This patch has three branches, of which the second one (line 6) is the most interesting: whenever
client has bid but the bidding is not yet Done, Lifty only redacts the value that might potentially
be stored inside x3, but not whether x3 is Nothing or Just (here mbMap is Haskell’s fmap specialized
to Maybe). Note that Lifty proves safety of this branch solely based on the type of mbMap:
mbMap :: (α → β) → Maybe α → Maybe β
2.4.4 State Updates. Continuing with the auction example, consider the implementation of the
function placeBid client b, which first retrieves everyone’s current bids, then updates client’s
bid, and finally displays all the previously retrieved bids to client. In this case, reusing the patch
from above would result in hiding too much, since x3 would reflect client’s (missing) bid at the
time of retrieval; by the time of output, however, client has already bid and has the right to see
who else did. Lifty would insert a correct repair, since it can reason about state updates, and in
this case can statically determine that s[bid u] , ∅ holds of the output context.
3 THE λL TYPE SYSTEM
We now formalize the type system of a core security-typed language λL , which underlies the
design of Lifty. The main novelty of this type system is representing security labels as policy
predicates. This brings two important benefits: on the one hand, our type system directly supports
context-dependent policies; on the other hand, we show how to reduce type checking of λL
problems to liquid type inference [Rondon et al. 2008]. As a result, our type system design enables
automatic verification of information flow security against context-dependent policies, and requires
no auxiliary user annotations. Moreover, Sec. 4 also demonstrates how this design enables precise
fault localization required for type-targeted synthesis of policy-enforcing code.
Another novelty of the λL type system is its support for policies that depend on sensitive values,
including self-referential policies (Sec. 2.4.2). Until now, these policies were only handled by run-
time techniques such as Jeeves [Austin et al. 2013; Yang et al. 2012]. To support safe enforcement
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Program Terms
v ::= c | λx . e Values
e ::= v | x | e e Expressions
| if e then e else e
| get e
| bind e e | ⌊e⌋
s ::= let x = e in s Statements
| set x x
| print x x
Types
B ::= Bool | Str | User Base types
| ⟨T ⟩π | Ref T
T ::= {B | r } | x : T → T ′ Types
Refinements
r ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬r | r ⊕ r Refinement terms
| r [r ] | x | r r | · · ·
⊕ ∈ {= | ∧ | ∨ |⇒}
π ::= λ(s,u). r Policy predicates
Fig. 6. Syntax of the core language λL .
of these policies, λL includes a novel safe downgrading construct (Sec. 3.3), and features a custom
security guarantee, which we call contextual noninterference (Sec. 3.4).
3.1 Syntax of λL
λL is a simple core language with references, extended with several information-flow specific
contructs. We summarize the syntax of λL in Fig. 6.
Program terms. λL differentiates between expressions and statements. Expressions include store
read (get), monadic bind (bind), and safe downgrading (⌊·⌋), which we describe in detail below. A
statement can modify the store (set) or output a value to a user (print). In the interest of clarity,
we restrict the presentation in this section to a version of λL where each program contains a single
set or print statement; we defer the presentation of the full language with multiple statement to
Appendix C. Furthermore, in order to focus on the challenges introduced by context-dependent
policies, we keep statements unconditional, and thus avoid the—tedious but standard—complications
associated with implicit flows (such as having to keep track of the latent security level). Implicit
flows have to be encoded by passing conditional expressions as arguments to set or print.
Types. λL supports static information flow tracking via tagged types. The type ⟨T ⟩π (“T tagged
with π”) attaches a policy predicate π : (Σ, User) → Bool to a type T (here Σ is the type of stores,
which map locations to values). A tagged type is similar to a labeled type in existing security-typed
languages [Pottier and Simonet 2003; Sabelfeld and Myers 2003; Swamy et al. 2010], except the
domain of labels is not an abstract lattice, but rather the lattice of predicates over stores and users.
Intuitively, a value of type ⟨T ⟩λ(s,u).p can be revealed in any store s to any user u, such that p holds.
Here p is a refinement predicate over the program variables in scope and the policy parameters s
and u. The exact set of refinement predicates depends on the chosen refinement logic; the only
requirement is that the logic be decidable to enable automatic type checking. We assume that
the logic at least includes the theories of uninterpreted functions (x and r r ) and arrays (r [r ] and
r [r := r ]), which λL uses to encode policy predicates and store reads/writes, respectively.
Other types of λL include primitive types, references, as well as refinement types and dependent
function types, which are standard [Knowles and Flanagan 2010; Rondon et al. 2008]. In a refined
base types {B | r }, r is a refinement predicate over the program variables and a special value
variable ν , which denotes the bound variable of the type.
Constants. As is standard in refinement types literature [Knowles and Flanagan 2010], the syn-
tactic category of constants, c , include values of primitive types and built-in functions on them.
To formalize the Lifty’s notion of a policy module, we assume constants include a predefined
set of store locations and fields (functions that return locations). The type of each constant c
Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
Enforcing Information Flow Policies
with Type-Targeted Program Synthesis 1:11
Expression Evaluation σ , e −→ e
e-get
σ , get l −→ σ [l] e-downgrade σ , ⌊v⌋ −→ v
e-bind
σ , bind v (λx : T .e) −→ [x 7→ v]e
Statement Execution σ , s −→ σ
set
σ , set l v −→ σ [l := v] print σ , print u v −→ σ [u +=v]
Fig. 7. λL operational semantics.
is determined by an auxiliary function ty(c). For example, in a conference manager we define
ty(title) = PaperId → ⟨String⟩λ(s,u).⊤. Since λL programs do not allocate new references at run
time, the type of any location l is known a-priori and can be obtained through ty(l), which is why
our typing rules do not keep track of a “store environment”.
3.2 Dynamic Semantics of λL
The run time behavior of λL programs is straightforward; we present non-standard rules in Fig. 7
(the full set of rules can be found in Appendix C). Expression evaluation happens in the context
of a store σ : (Loc → Value) ∪ (User → Value∗), which has two disjoint components. The first
component is standard and is read and modified through get and set, respectively; the second
component represents each user’s output channel is modified through print.
The dynamic semantics of tagged primitives is trivial, since λL only tracks policies statically. ⌊·⌋
is an identity function, while bind corresponds to the bind of the identity monad.
3.3 Static Semantics of λL
Fig. 8 shows a subset of subtyping and type checking rules for λL that are relevant to information
flow tracking. Other rules are standard for languages with decidable refinement types [Rondon
et al. 2008; Vazou et al. 2013, 2014a,b] and deferred to Appendix C. In Fig. 8, a typing environment
Γ ::= ϵ | Γ,x : T | Γ, r maps variables to types and records path conditions r .
Subtyping.We only show subtyping rules for tagged types. The rule <:-Tag1 allows embedding
a pure computation into a public computation (it serves as an implicit monadic return). The rule
<:-Tag2 specifies that tagged types are contravariant in their policy parameter; this relation allows
“upgrading” a term with a less restrictive policy (more public) into one with a more restrictive policy
(more secret) and not the other way around. The premise Γ ⊨ r ′ ⇒ r checks implication between
the policies under the assumptions stored in the environment (which include path conditions and
refinements on program variables). By restricting refinement predicates to decidable logic, we
make sure that this premise can be validated by an SMT solver. To our knowledge, λL is the first
security-typed language that supports automatic upgrading for expressive policies.
Term typing. The rest of Fig. 8 defines the typing judgments for expressions (Γ;σ ⊢ e :: T ) and
statements (Γ;σ ⊢ s). Since λL is stateful, the judgments keep track of the current store σ , which is
used in the rule T-get to precisely characterize the retrieved value. The rule for conditionals (P-If)
is standard, but we include it because verification of programs with policy checks relies crucially on
its path-sensitivity. For example, in Fig. 4, x1 is assigned the precise type {Phase | ν = σ [phase]},
and hence the sensitive term get (status p) is type-checked in an environment extended with
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Subtyping Γ ⊢ T <: T ′
<:-Tag1
Γ ⊢ T <: ⟨T ⟩λ .⊤
<:-Tag2
Γ ⊢ T <: T ′ Γ ⊨ r ′ ⇒ r
Γ ⊢ ⟨T ⟩λ .r <: ⟨T ′⟩λ .r ′
Expression Typing Γ;σ ⊢ e :: T
T-get
Γ;σ ⊢ x :: Ref {B | r }
Γ;σ ⊢ get x :: {B | r ∧ ν = σ [x]}
T-If
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: {Bool | r }
Γ, [ν 7→ ⊤]r ⊢ e1 :: T Γ, [ν 7→ ⊥]r ⊢ e2 :: T
Γ;σ ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 :: T
T-bind
Γ;σ ⊢ e1 :: ⟨T1⟩π Γ;σ ⊢ e2 :: T1 → ⟨T2⟩π
Γ;σ ⊢ bind e1 e2 :: ⟨T2⟩π
T- ⌊ ·⌋
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: ⟨{Bool | ν ⇒ r }⟩λ .π [(s,u)]∧r
Γ;σ ⊢ ⌊e⌋ :: ⟨Bool⟩π
Statement Typing Γ;σ ⊢ s
T-print
Γ;σ ⊢ x1 :: ⟨{User | π [(σ ,ν )]}⟩π Γ;σ ⊢ x2 :: ⟨Str⟩π
Γ;σ ⊢ print x1 x2
T-set
Γ;σ ⊢ x1 :: Ref T Γ;σ ⊢ x2 :: T
Γ;σ ⊢ set x1 x2
Fig. 8. Typing rules of λL .
the path condition ⊤ = (σ [phase] = Done), which is sufficient to prove that it complies with the
expected policy.
The core of information flow checking in λL are the rules T-bind and T-print, which, in combi-
nation with contravariant subtyping, guarantee that tagged values only flow into allowed contexts.
To this end, T-bind postulates that applying a sensitive function to a sensitive value, yields a result
that is at least as secret as either of them. According to T-print, a print statement takes as input a
tagged user (which may be computed from sensitive data) and a tagged result. The rule requires
both arguments to be tagged with the same policy π , and crucially, π must hold of the viewer in
the current store (i.e. both the viewer identity and the message must be visible to the viewer). Here
π [(σ ,ν )] stands for “applying” the policy predicate; formally (λ(s,u).p)[(σ ,ν )]  p[s 7→ σ ,u 7→ ν ].
Downgrading. The safe downgrading construct, ⌊e⌋, is a novel feature of λL , which we introduced
specifically to support static verification of programs with self-referential policies (Sec. 2.4.2).
Informally, the idea is that we can we can safely downgrade a tagged term e (i.e. weaken its policy)
whenever we can prove that e is constant, since constants cannot leak information. Constancy is
hard to check automatically in general, but the special case where e is a tagged boolean turns out to
be both amenable to automatic verification and particularly useful for self-referential policies.
The rule T-⌊·⌋ allows tagging ⌊e⌋ with λ(s,u).p as long as there exists a refinement term r over
program variables, such that e can be tagged with λ(s,u).p ∧ r and the value of e implies r . This
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operation is safe because whenever r holds, the two policies are the same; while whenever ¬r
holds, the value of e is guaranteed to be false (a constant).
To illustrate the application of this rule, consider the following simple λL program:
let x = ⌊bind (get (authors p)) ( λ ys . elem client ys)⌋ in
print client x
where authors has the policy λ.u ∈ s[authors p]. Even though client might not be an author, this
program type-checks successfully, by instantiating the rule T-⌊·⌋ with π ≡ λ.u = client ∧ s = σ
and r ≡ client ∈ σ [authors p]. This program also satisfies contextual noninterference (Sec. 3.4):
it does not allow client to distinguish between two author lists they shouldn’t see.
As a counter-example, replacing elem client x above with x = [] leads to a type error, since in
this case x cannot be safely downgraded to π (no r satisfies the premise of T-⌊·⌋). This program
also violates contextual noninterference, since client can tell the difference between two secret
author lists: say, [] and [alice], where alice , client.
In Lifty, downgrading does not normally appear in user-written code; rather, the compiler uses
it when generating policy checks for self-referential policies (see Sec. 2.4.2 for an example).
Algorithmic type checking. As is customary for expressive type systems, the rules in Fig. 8 are
not algorithmic: they require “guessing” appropriate policy predicates for intermediate terms (when
applying rules T-Print and T-Bind), as well as the predicate r in T-⌊·⌋. Our insight is that we
can re-purpose liquid type inference [Cosman and Jhala 2017; Rondon et al. 2008; Vazou et al.
2013], which has been previously used to automatically discover unknown refinements, to also
discover these unknown predicates. To this end, our typing rules are carefully designed to respect
the restrictions imposed by Liquid Types, such as that all unknown predicates occur positively in
specifications. As a result, we obtain fully automatic verification for programs with (decidable)
context-dependent policies.
3.4 Contextual Noninterference in λL
We want to show that well-typed λL programs do not leak information. Traditionally, this property
is formalized as noninterference: a leak-free program must take low-equivalent stores to low-
equivalent stores. In the presence of context-dependent policies, this traditional definition does
not directly apply. Instead, we enforce contextual noninterference, a guarantee similar to that of the
Jeeves language [Austin et al. 2013; Yang et al. 2012].
One difference is that our security levels are defined relative to an observer. Hence we want to
show that an observer o : User cannot tell the difference between two o-equivalent stores (those
that only differ in locations secret from o).
More importantly, λL policies depend on the values in the store, which brings two major com-
plications. First, a store update can cause a previously secret location to become visible, thereby
breaking o-equivalence. For example, advancing the conference phase to Done automatically reveals
all (previously secret) status locations, which is the intended behavior. Hence, we cannot show
that all well-typed λL programs preserve o-equivalence; instead, we show that print-programs do
so, while set-programs produce stores that agree on all previously visible locations. By combining
these two lemmas, we can show that programs in the full language (with multiple print and set
statements, Appendix C) preserve equivalence on the set of locations that are never revealed.
Second, consider two stores that differ on location l , where l is secret in one store and visible in
the other. Should o be permitted to differentiate between these stores? Following Jeeves, contextual
non-interference allows this observation (in other words, these stores are not o-equivalent by our
definition). This decision is motivated by real-world scenarios we are trying to model: for example,
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in a social network where my location is only visible to my friends, I don’t care if the attacker can
tell that my real location is hidden, as long as they cannot tell whether I’m at home or at work. At
a first glance, this might introduce leaks through policy checks: indeed, the attacker now knows
that we are not friends. However, such leaks are actually prevented by the λL type system: if the
code passed the type checker, the friendship information must have been visible to the attacker4.
Definition 3.1 (policy of a type). For a tagged type, pol(⟨T ⟩π ) = π ; otherwise pol(T ) = λ.⊤.
Definition 3.2 (observable location). For some observer o : User and two stores σ1,σ2, a location l
is o-observable—written l ∈ obso(σ1,σ2)—if it is visible to o at least in one store:
π [(σ1,o)] ∨ π [(σ2,o)] where π ≡ pol(ty(l))
Definition 3.3 (observational equivalence). For some observer o : User, two stores σ1,σ2 are o-
equivalent—written σ1 ∼o σ2—if they agree on o’s output and all o-observable locations:
σ1[o] = σ2[o] ∧ ∀l ∈ obso(σ1,σ2).σ1[l] = σ2[l]
Lemma 3.4 (contextual noninterference of expressions). For some observer o : User and two
o-equivalent stores, σ1 ∼o σ2, an expression e of an o-observable type evaluates to the same value: if
ϵ ⊢ e :: T with pol(T )[(σj ,o)] and σj , e −→∗ vj for j ∈ {1, 2}, then v1 = v2.
Proof outline. The proof is by induction on the typing derivation (after generalizing to open
terms). The only nontrivial case is downgrading: Γ;σ ⊢ ⌊e⌋ :: ⟨Bool⟩π . We have Γ;σ ⊢ e ::
⟨{Bool | ν ⇒ r }⟩λ .π [(s,u)]∧r and σj , e −→∗ vj ; we need to show v1 = v2. Suppose this is not the
case; then since σ1 ∼o σ2, this means that e reads from unobservable locations, which in turn means
that its policy must be violated in both stores. But this can only happen if σ1[r ] = σ2[r ] = ⊥ (since
π [(σj ,o)] holds for j ∈ {1, 2}. If that is true, however, then by soundness of refinement types it
follows that v1 = v2 = ⊥, a contradiction.
Lemma 3.5 (contextual noninterference for print-statements). For some observer o : User
and two o-equivalent stores, σ1 ∼o σ2, a print-program s of the form let x1 = e1 in . . . print u y
produces o-equivalent stores: if σj , sj −→∗ σ ′j for j ∈ {1, 2}, then σ ′1 ∼o σ ′2 .
Proof outline. From the type rule for print and soundness of refinement types, we can show
that π [(σj ,o)] holds for j ∈ {1, 2}, and apply Lemma 3.4.
By definition of o-equivalence, it follows that o cannot observe the difference between two
o-equivalent stores through output.
Lemma 3.6 (contextual noninterference for set-statements). For some observer o : User
and two o-equivalent stores, σ1 ∼o σ2, a set-program s of the form let x1 = e1 in . . . set x y
produces stores that are equivalent on previously visible locations: if σj , sj −→∗ σ ′j for j ∈ {1, 2}, then
σ ′1[o] = σ ′2[o] ∧ ∀l ∈ obso(σ1,σ2).σ ′1[l] = σ ′2[l].
4 TARGETED SYNTHESIS FOR λL
We now turn to the heart of our system: the type-targeted synthesis algorithm Enforce, shown
in Fig. 9. The algorithm takes as input a typing environment Γ, a program e , and a top-level type
annotation T , and determines whether policy-enforcing code can be injected into e to produce e ′,
such that Γ ⊢ e ′ :: T . The algorithm proceeds in two steps. First, procedure Localize identifies
unsafe terms (line 2), replacing them with type casts to produce a “program with holes” eˆ (Sec. 4.1).
Second, the algorithm replaces each type cast in eˆ with an appropriate patch, generated by the
procedure Generate (Sec. 4.2).
4This is similar to the LIO [Stefan and Mazières 2014] rule that “the label on the label is the label itself”.
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1: Enforce(Γ, e,T )
2: eˆ ← Localize(Γ ⊢ e :: T )
3: for ⟨Te ◁Ta⟩d ∈ eˆ do
4: d ′ ← Generate([x0 : Ta], Γ,Te )[x0 7→ d]
5: eˆ ← eˆ[⟨Te ◁Ta⟩d 7→ d ′]
6: Generate(ΓB , ΓG , ⟨T ⟩π )
7: ΓB ← ΓB∪ R
8: branches← SynthesizeAll(ΓB ⊢ ?? :: ⟨T ⟩λ .⊥)
9: conds← Abduce(ΓG , ?? ⊢ b :: ⟨T ⟩π ) for b ∈ branches
10: ((dflt, c) : guarded) ← sort (branches, conds) by conds weakest to strongest
11: if c = ⊤ then
12: patch← dflt
13: else fail
14: for (c,b) ← guarded do
15: guard ← Synthesize(Γ ⊢ ?? :: ⟨{ν : Bool | ν ⇔ c}⟩π )
16: patch← bind(guard)(λд.if д then b else patch)
17: return patch
Fig. 9. Policy enforcement algorithm
4.1 Fault Localization
Type casts. For the purpose of fault localization, we extend the values of λL with type casts:
v ::= · · · | ⟨T ◁T ′⟩
Statically, our casts are similar to those in prior work [Knowles and Flanagan 2010]; in particular,
the cast ⟨T ◁ T ′⟩ has type T ′ → T . However, the dynamic semantics of casts in λL is undefined.
The idea is that casts are inserted solely for the purpose of targeting synthesis, and, if synthesis
succeeds, are completely eliminated. We restrict the notion of type-safe λL programs to those that
are well-typed are free of type casts.
Sound localizations. The goal of algorithm Localize is to infer a minimal sound localization of
the term e .
Definition 4.1 (sound localization). A term eˆ is a sound localization of e at type T in Γ, if (1) eˆ is
obtained from e by inserting type casts, i.e. replacing one or more subterms ei in e by ⟨Ti ◁T ′i ⟩ei ;
(2) it is type correct, i.e. Γ ⊢ eˆ :: T
In particular, note that (2) implies that each ei has type T ′i .
Lemma 4.2 (Localization). Replacing each subterm of the form ⟨Ti ◁T ′i ⟩ ei in a sound localization
of e with a type-safe term of type Ti , yields a type-safe program.
This lemma follows directly from (2) and the substitution lemma for refinement types [Knowles
and Flanagan 2010]. Crucially, it shows that once a sound localization has been found, patch
generation can proceed independently for each type cast.
Minimal localizations. Among sound localizations, not all are equally desirable. Intuitively, we
would like to make minimal changes to the behavior of the original program. Formalizing and
checking this directly is hard, so we approximate it with the following two properties. A sound
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localization is syntactically minimal if no type cast can be removed or moved to a subterm without
breaking soundness. Picking syntactically minimal localizations leads to patching smaller terms,
rather than trying to rewrite the whole program.
Once the unsafe terms are fixed, we can still pick different expected typesTi . Intuitively, the more
restrictive the Ti , the less likely are we to find a patch to replace the cast. A minimal localization
is syntactically minimal, and all its expected types cannot be made any less restrictive without
breaking soundness. In general, there can be multiple minimal localizations, and a general program
repair engine would have to explore them all, leading to inefficiency. For the specific problem of
policy enforcement, however, there is a reasonable default, which we infer as shown below.
Inferring the localization. Algorithm Localize first uses liquid type inference [Cosman and Jhala
2017; Rondon et al. 2008; Vazou et al. 2013] to reduce the problem of checking the source program
e against type T to a system of Horn constraints. If the constraints have a solution, it returns e
unmodified. Otherwise, Localize first makes sure that all conflicting clauses have been generated
by the second premise of <:-Tag2 (implication on policy predicates). If this is not the case, the type
error is unrelated to information flow, and is simply reported to the user. If the check succeeds,
however, Localize removes those conflicting Horn clauses that were generated by the smallest
term, and re-runs the fixpoint solver on the remaining system, inferring strongest solutions for
policy predicates.
Next, it resets the non-policy refinements of the removed terms to ⊤ and re-check the validity of
the constraints. If the constraints are satisfied, we have obtained a sound and minimal localization
(the expected types are the least restrictive because policies are strongest, and other refinements
are ⊤). If the constraints are violated, it indicates that the program depends on some functional
property of the unsafe term we want to replace. We consider such programs out of scope: if a
programmer wants to benefit form automatic policy enforcement, they have to give up the ability
to reason about functional properties of sensitive values, since our language reserves the right to
substitute them with other values.
4.2 Patch Generation
Next, we describe how our algorithm replaces a type-cast ⟨Te ◁Ta⟩ d with a type-safe term d ′ of
the expected type Te , using the patch generation procedure Generate (line 4). At a high level, the
goal of this step is to generate a term of a given refinement type Te , which is the problem tackled
by type-driven synthesis as implemented in Synqid [Polikarpova et al. 2016]. Unfortunately,
Generate cannot use Synqid out of the box, because the expected type Te is not a full functional
specification: this type only contains policies but no type refinements, allowing trivial solutions to
the synthesis problem, such returning an arbitrary constant with the right type shape.
To avoid such undesired patches, procedure Generate implements a specialized synthesis
strategy: first, it generates a list of branches, which return the original term redacted to a different
extent; then, for each branch, it infers an optimal guard (a policy check) that makes the branch
satisfy the expected type; finally, it constructs the patch by arranging the properly guarded branches
into a (monadic) conditional.
Synthesis of branches. In line 8, Generate uses Synqid to synthesize the set of all terms up
to certain size with the right content type, but with no restriction on the policy. Branches are
generated in a restricted environment ΓB , which contains only the original faulty term and a small
set of redaction functions R. This set is specified by the programmer, and typically includes a “default
value” of each type, as well as custom redactions such as mbMap in Sec. 2.4.3. This restriction gives
the user control over the space of patches and also makes the synthesis more efficient.
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Synthesis of guards. For each of the branches b (which include at least the original term), Gener-
ate attempts to synthesize the optimal guard that would make b respect the expected type. At a
high level, this guard must be logically equivalent to a formula c , such that (1) c ∧ p ⇔ q, where
λ(s,u).p  π is the expected policy of the patch, and λ(s,u).q is the actual policy of branch b; (2) c
does not mention the policy parameters s and u. This predicate can be inferred using existing
techniques, such as logical abduction [Dillig and Dillig 2013]. In particular, Generate relies on
Synqid’s liquid abduction mechanism [Polikarpova et al. 2016] to infer c for each branch in line 9.
Next, we sort the branches according to their abduced conditions, form weakest to strongest
(i.e. in the reverse order of how they are going to appear in the program). In line 11, we check that
the first branch can be used as the default branch, i.e. it is correct unconditionally. This property is
always satisfied as long as ΓB contains a value v of type T .
The main challenge of guard synthesis, however, is that the guard itself must be monadic, since it
might need to retrieve and compute over some data from the store. Since the data it retrieves might
itself be sensitive, we need to ensure that two conditions are satisfied (1) functional correctness: the
guard returns a value equivalent to c , and (2) no leaky enforcement: the guard itself respects the
expected policy π of the patch. To ensure both conditions, we obtain the guard via type-driven
synthesis, providing ⟨{ν : Bool | ν ⇔ c}⟩π as the target type.
Lemma 4.3 (Safe patch generation). If Generate succeeds, it produces a type-safe term of the
expected type ⟨T ⟩π .
Assuming correctness of Synthesize and Abduce, we can use the typing rules of Sec. 3 to show
that the invariant Γ ⊢ patch :: ⟨T ⟩π is established in line 12 and maintained in line 16. In particular,
the type of bound variable д in line 16 is {ν : Bool | ν ⇔ c}, hence, then branch is checked under
the path condition c ⇔ ⊤, which implies ΓG ⊢ b :: ⟨T ⟩π .
We would also like to provide a guarantee that a patch produced by Generate is minimal, i.e.,
in each concrete execution, its return value retains the maximum information allowed by π from
the original term. We can show that, for a fixed set of generated branches, the patch will always
pick the most sensitive one that is allowed by π , since the guards characterize precisely when
each branch is safe. Of course, the set of generated branches is restricted to terms of certain size
constructed from components in ΓB . The original term, however, is always in ΓB , hence we are
guaranteed to retain the original value whenever allowed by π .
4.3 Guarantees and Limitations
In this section we summarize the soundness guarantee of type-targeted synthesis in λL and then
discuss the limitations on its completeness and minimality.
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness of type-targeted synthesis). If procedure Enforce succeeds, it
produces a program that satisfies contextual noninterference.
This is straightforward by combining Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 with Lemma 3.5.
Completeness. When does procedure Enforce fail? As explained in Sec. 4.1, Localize can fail,
when its proposed localization is not safe, which can happen either because the original program
contains an error unrelated to information flow, or because the program depends on some functional
property of a sensitive value we want to replace. Generate can fail in lines 9, 13, and 15. The first
failure can happen if the abduction engine is not powerful enough to infer the precise difference
between the expected and the actual policy of a branch (this does not happen in our case studies).
The second failure indicates that ΓB does not contain any sufficiently public terms; in this case,
Lifty prompts the programmer to add a default value of an appropriate type.
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Code size (AST nodes) Time
Policy enforcing
Benchmark Original (Lifty) Localize Generate Total
1 EDAS 79 25 0.01s 0.06s 0.08s
2 EDAS-Multiple 100 50 0.01s 0.17s 0.19s
3 EDAS-Self-Ref 100 76 0.01s 0.26s 0.29s
4 Auction 48 83 0.03s 0.61s 0.65s
5 Auction-Place-Bid 74 58 0.07s 0.70s 0.78s
6 Search 82 25 0.03s 0.08s 0.12s
7 Sort 72 58 0.01s 0.24s 0.26s
8 Broadcast 25 25 0.00s 0.06s 0.08s
9 HotCRP 61 29 0.02s 0.01s 0.05s
10 AirBnB 60 31 0.01s 0.02s 0.05s
11 Instagram 73 25 0.01s 3.19s 3.22s
Table 1. Microbenchmarks.
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Fig. 10. Scalability—N accesses in a single function.
The third failure is the most interesting one: it happens when no guard satisfies both functional
and security requirements, indicating that the policy is not enforceable without leaking some other
sensitive information. For instance, in the EDAS leak example, if the programmer declared phase
to be only visible to the program chair, no program could enforce the policy on status without
leaking the information about phase. In this case, Lifty prompts the programmer to change the
policies in a way that respects dependencies between sensitive fields (i.e. to make the policy on
status at least as restrictive as the one on phase).
Minimality. We would like to show that the changes made by Enforce are minimal: in any
execution where e did not cause a leak, e ′ would output the same values as e . Unfortunately, this is
not true, even though we have shown that Localize produces least restrictive expected types and
Generate synthesizes minimal patches. The reason is that even the least restrictive expected type
might over-approximate the set of output contexts, because of the imprecisions of refinement type
inference. In these cases, Enforce is conservative: i.e. it hides more information than is strictly
necessary. One example is if the state is updated in between the get and the print by calling
a function for which no precise refinement type can be inferred. Another example is when the
same sensitive value with a viewer-dependent policy is displayed to multiple users. In our case
studies, we found that in the restricted class of data-centric applications that Lifty is intended
for, these patterns occur rarely. One approach to overcoming this limitation would be to combine
type-targeted synthesis with runtime techniques similar to Jeeves.
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(a) Conference Management System Policy size (AST nodes): 345
Code size (AST nodes) Time
Policy enforcing Manual Auto
Benchmark Original Manual Auto Verify Localize Generate Total
Register user 10 0 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
View users 20 9 24 0.01s 0.01s 0.58s 0.59s
Paper submission 45 0 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
Search papers 77 96 82 0.90s 0.08s 7.03s 7.11s
Show paper record 53 46 82 0.34s 0.04s 7.89s 7.94s
Show reviews for paper 57 54 45 0.39s 0.07s 0.58s 0.66s
User profile: GET 66 0 0 0.03s 0.03s 0.00s 0.03s
User profile: POST 17 0 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
Submit review 40 0 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
Assign reviewers 47 0 0 0.01s 0.01s 2.25s 2.26s
Totals 432 205 233 1.71s 0.27s 18.36s 18.64s
(b) Gradr—Course Management System Policy size (AST nodes): 141
Code size (AST nodes) Time
Policy enforcing
Benchmark Original (Lifty) Localize Generate Total
Display the home page (static content) 12 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
Student: get classes 13 0 0.05s 0.00s 0.05s
Instructor: get classes 13 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
Get class information for a user 21 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
View a user’s profile (owner) 27 0 0.00s 0.00s 0.00s
View a user’s profile (any user) 29 29 0.01s 0.02s 0.04s
Instructor: view scores for an assignment 36 56 0.00s 0.29s 0.30s
Student: view all scores for user 36 56 0.00s 0.28s 0.30s
Instructor: view top scores for an assignment 62 56 0.01s 0.29s 0.31s
Totals 253 197 0.12s 0.92s 1.04s
(c) HealthWeb—Health Information Portal Policy size (AST nodes): 194
Code size (AST nodes) Time
Policy enforcing
Benchmark Original (Lifty) Localize Generate Total
Search a record by id 23 271 0.01s 1.72s 1.74s
Search a record by patient 56 271 0.01s 2.90s 2.92s
Show authored records 45 0 0.01s 0.00s 0.01s
Update record 34 2 0.00s 1.66s 1.67s
List patients for a doctor 52 42 0.01s 0.05s 0.07s
Totals 210 586 0.05s 6.36s 6.42s
Table 2. Case studies: conference management, course manager, health portal.
5 EVALUATION
To evaluate type-targeted synthesis, we have implemented a prototype Lifty compiler. Our im-
plementation extends the Synquid program synthesizer [Polikarpova et al. 2016]. From Synquid,
Lifty inherits ML-style polymorphism, fixpoints, and user-defined data types. As a result, we
were able to encode the tagged monad as a library, with ⟨·⟩ implemented as a polymorphic data
type with a hidden constructor. After inserting the necessary patches, our compiler translates the
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resulting Lifty code into Haskell, and can link it with other Haskell modules. Hence, a possible
usage scenario for Lifty is to serve as a language for the data-centric application core, while
low-level libraries can be implemented directly in Haskell.
Using the Lifty compiler, we implemented (1) a set of microbenchmarks that highlight chal-
lenging scenarios and model reported real-world leaks; and (2) three larger case studies based on
existing applications from the literature. Our goal is to evaluate the following parameters:
• Expressiveness of policy language. We demonstrate that Lifty is expressive enough
to support interesting policies from in a range of problem domains, including conference
management, course management, health records, and social networks. In particular, we
were able to replicate all the desired policies in three case studies from prior work [Swamy
et al. 2010; Yang et al. 2016].
• Scalability.We show that the Lifty compiler is reasonably efficient at error localization and
synthesis: Lifty is able to generate all necessary patches for our conference manager case
study (450 lines of Lifty) in about 20 seconds. Furthermore, we show that synthesis times
are linear in the number of required patches.
• Quality of patches. We compare the code generated by Lifty to a version with manual
policy enforcement; we show that Lifty allows for policy descriptions to be centralized and
concise, and the compiler is able to recover all necessary policy-enforcing code, without
reducing functionality.
All programs in our evaluation share a common library, which offers a set of basic functions on
primitive types, lists, and the option type, along with a set of monadic combinators for convenient
manipulation of tagged values (mapM, filterM, etc). The library also defines a standard set of redaction
function, which comprises false, 0, [], "", Nothing, and mbMap. In addition to this set, several
programs define custom redaction function, either to designate a default value for a user-defined
data type (such as NoDecision in our running example) or to perform nontrivial anonymization
(see examples below).
5.1 Microbenchmarks
To exercise the flexibility of our language, we implemented a series of small but challenging
microbenchmarks, summarized in Tab. 1. The code of each benchmark, with leak patches inserted
by Lifty, is available in Appendix B.
Benchmarks 1–5 in Tab. 1 correspond to the examples from Sec. 2: EDAS is our running example
of the EDAS leak, and the other four are the more challenging scenarios introduced in Sec. 2.4.
Benchmarks 6 and 7 exercise tricky cases of implicit flow through higher-order functions. Search
displays the titles of all client’s accepted papers. It is essentially a variant of EDAS, where the
implicit flow happens through a filter; Lifty inserts a patch inside the filter’s predicate.
Sort displays the list of all conference submissions sorted by their score, using a higher-order
sort function with a custom comparator. The order of submissions might leak paper scores to
a conflicted reviewer. To prevent this leak, Lifty rewrites the comparator to return a default
score is a paper is conflicted with the viewer. Interestingly, this benchmark features a negative
self-referential policy for the list of conflicted reviewers: this list is visible only to users who are not
on the list. Such policies are not supported by Jeeves, since they are incompatible with its fixpoint
interpretation of self-referential policies (Sec. 6); in Lifty, the semantics of policies is decoupled
from their evaluation, hence this example presents no difficulty.
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Broadcast sends a decision notification to all authors of a given paper5. This benchmark tests
Lifty’s ability to handle messages sent to multiple users; Lifty infers that all those users are authors
of the paper, and hence are allowed to see its status, as long as the phase is Done. An additional
challenge is that the list of recipients is itself sensitive, since the conference is double-blind; Lifty
infers that no additional check is needed, since authors are always allowed to see themselves.
The last three benchmarks model reported real-world leaks. HotCRP models a leak in the HotCRP
conference manager, first reported in [Yip et al. 2009], where the conference chair could send
password reminder emails to PC members, and then glean their passwords from the email preview.
Lifty repairs this leak by masking the password in the preview (but not in the actual email), since
the preview is flowing to the chair, while the email is flowing to the owner of the password.
AirBnB models a leak in the AirBnB website, found by one of our students [Voss 2016]. The
website redacts phone numbers from user messages (presumably to keep people from going around
the site), but phone numbers appear unredacted in message previews. In Lifty we model the
AirBnB messaging system by designating the message text visible only to its sender and the site
administrator, and introducing a special redaction function scrubPhoneNumbers, whose result is
additionally visible to the message recipient. With these policies, whenever a message is displayed
to the recipient, Lifty inserts a check whether they are the administrator, and otherwise redacts
the text with scrubPhoneNumbers.
Instagram is inspired by several reported cases, where sensitive social network data was revealed
through recommendation algorithms [Hill 2017; Yang 2017]. In particular, if an Instagram account
is private, their photos and “following” relations are supposedly only visible to their followers
(which have to be approved by the user). Yet, journalist Ashley Feinberg was able to identify the
private Instagram account of the former FBI director James Comey, because Instagram mistakenly
revealed that James was followed by his son Brien (whose account is public). In Lifty, we model
the Instagram “following” relation using a field
isFollowing :: x : User → y : User → Ref ⟨Bool⟩λ .canSee(s,u,x )∧canSee(s,u,y)
whose policy requires that both accounts be visible to the viewer (here, canSee(s,u,x) holds iff x is
public, x = u, or u follows x ). When the recommendation system attempts to retrieve all accounts
followed by Brien Comey, Lifty injects a check that those accounts be visible to the viewer, and
otherwise isFollowing defaults to false.
5.2 Case Studies
We use Lifty to implement three larger case studies: a conference manager and a course manager,
both based on the case studies for the policy-agnostic Jacqueline system [Yang et al. 2016], and a
health portal based on the HealthWeb example from Fine [Swamy et al. 2010]. The two authors
who developed the case studies were not involved in the development of Lifty.
Conference manager. We implemented two versions of a basic academic conference manager:
one where the programmer enforces the policies by hand and one where Lifty is responsible for
injecting leak patches. The manager handles confidentiality policies for papers in different phases
of the conference and different paper statuses, based on the role of the viewer. Policies depend on
this state, as well as additional properties such as conflicts with a particular paper. The system
provides features for displaying the paper title and authors, status, list of conflicts, and conference
information conditional on acceptance. Information may be displayed to the user currently logged
5For this purpose we introduce a version of print that accepts a tagged list of viewers instead of a single tagged viewer; this
operation has to be built in, since Lifty’s statements are unconditional.
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record :: rid : RecordId → Ref ⟨RecordId⟩λ .u=author (s[r id ])∨...
(isPatient s u∧u=patient s[r id]∧¬(withhold u s[r id ]))∨...
(isDoctor s u∧¬(withhold u s[r id ]))∨...
(isPsychiatrist s u∧isTreating u s[r id ]∧isPsychiatristRecord s[r id ]∧¬(withhold u s[r id ]))
isTreating :: x : User → y : User → Ref ⟨Bool⟩λ .isPsychiatrist s u ∧ u=x
Fig. 11. An excerpt from the policy module of the Health Portal case study.
in or sent via various means to different users. The system contains 888 lines of code in total (524
Lifty + 364 Haskell).
Jacqueline only supports constant default values, but we decided to deviate from the original
system to experiment with nontrivial redaction functions. In our version, reviewer names that
are hidden for any reason are displayed as “Reviewer A”, “Reviewer B”, etc., following common
convention. This is implemented by representing each reviewer entry as a pair of (index, name),
where the redaction replaces name with “Reviewer x ” according to index.
Course manager.We implemented a system for sending grades to students based on their course
enrollment and assignment status. An example policy is that a student can see their own scores,
whereas instructors can see scores for all of their students.
Health portal. Based on the HealthWeb case study from [Swamy et al. 2010], we implemented
a system that supports viewing and searching over health records. This case study is interesting
because of the complexity of the associated policies; we show some examples from the corresponding
policy module in Fig. 11. As you can see, the policy that guards health records is rather complex,
which makes the generated enforcement code significantly larger than the size of the original
program.
Additional complexity arises because some policies depend on sensitive values. For example, the
record’s policy depends on the result of isTreating, but isTreating has a policy of its own, which
makes the patients of a psychiatrist visible only to that psychiatrist. Lifty is able to generate and
verify a policy check for this case, since in this check isTreating is used only if isPsychiatrist is
true.
5.3 Performance Statistics
We show compilation times for the microbenchmarks in Tab. 1, and for the case studies in Tab. 2.
We break them down into fault localization (including type checking) and patch synthesis. Lifty
was able to patch each of the microbenchmarks in under a second, apart from Instagram, which
takes around 3.5 seconds. This time is dominated by condition abduction (line 9 of the algorithm
Enforce), which scales exponentially with the number of variables in scope and atomic predicates
in the relevant policies. For each of the three case studies, Lifty takes under 30 seconds.
Scalability. Note that Lifty verifies and patches each top-level function in a program completely
independently. Moreover, unlike prior work on program repair, patch synthesis proceeds inde-
pendently for multiple leaks inside one function. For a stress test, we created a benchmark that
performs N reads (of the same field, for convenience) and then a print to an arbitrary user. Lifty’s
job is to patch all of the get locations with a conditional. We show in Fig. 10 that patch generation
time is linear in N (verification is still quadratic in the size of the function, and dominates the
compilation time in this case).
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In summary, Lifty compilation times are most significantly affected by the complexity of the
policies and the number of arguments to the function under repair, while they scale roughly
linearly with the overall size of the system. This result suggests feasibility of applying type-targeted
synthesis to larger systems.
5.4 Quality of Patches
We compared the two versions of our conference manager (Tab. 2). The column “Original” shows the
size of the code, in AST nodes, without any policy enforcement. We also show the cumulative size
of policy-enforcing code, both hand-written and generated by Lifty. The size of policy predicates
is given as “Policy size”. Note that the size of policy-enforcing code often approaches or exceeds
the size of the core functionality, which confirms our hypothesis that for data-centric applications,
much of the programming burden is in policy enforcement. Manual inspection reveals that while the
two versions of policy-enforcing code are syntactically different, they differ in neither functionality
nor performance.
6 RELATEDWORK
Lifty builds upon several lines of prior work, most notably in sound program synthesis and repair,
policy-agnostic programming, static information flow control, and type-directed coercion insertion.
Each of these areas has a rich history, but until now they have developed relatively independently.
6.1 Program Synthesis and Repair
Lifty is related to sound program synthesis techniques [Alur et al. 2017; Kneuss et al. 2013; Kuncak
et al. 2010; Manna and Waldinger 1980; Polikarpova et al. 2016], which take a formal specification
as input and synthesize a provably correct program. These techniques, however, generate programs
from scratch, from end-to-end functional specifications, while Lifty injects code into an existing
program based on the cross-cutting concern of information flow.
Our problem statement is similar to that of sound program repair [Kneuss et al. 2015], but
as we explain in Sec. 2, in the specific setting of policy enforcement, Lifty is able to infer a
local specification for each patch, and synthesize all patches independently, which makes it more
scalable. There has been prior work on program repair for security concerns [Fredrikson et al.
2012; Ganapathy et al. 2006; Harris et al. 2010; Son et al. 2013], but it does not involve reasoning
about expressive information-flow policies, and hence, both the search space for patches and their
verification is much less complex.
6.2 Policy-Agnostic Programming
Lifty shares its high-level goal with systems like Hails [Giffin et al. 2012] and Jeeves [Yang et al.
2012], which enforce privacy policies without putting extra burden on the programmer. The main
difference is that Lifty enforces policies at compile time, by rewriting the code, while prior work
relies on runtime enforcement, which yields nontrivial runtime overheads and makes it difficult to
reason about program behavior in the presence of expressive policies.
Lifty’s programming model closely follows the policy-agnostic approach of Jeeves [Austin et al.
2013; Yang et al. 2016, 2012], which factors information flow out from core program functionality,
allowing programmers to implement policies as high-level predicates over the program state.
Practical policy-agnostic programming relies on two crucial features of the Jeeves semantics. First,
Jeeves lets the programmer designate a default value to be used in place of a sensitive value whenever
the latter is not visible; this allows the program to do something nontrivial when policy checks fail
(instead of just crashing, as in previous runtime enforcement systems). Second, Jeeves supports
policies that depend on sensitive values; these policies are ubiquitous in real-world scenarios, and
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supporting them directly (rather than having the programmer encode them with labels) is both
nontrivial and prevents a whole class of leaks. While powerful, these two features also cause the
two main limitations of Jeeves: runtime overhead and unpredictable semantics. With its static
approach, Lifty is able to address both of these limitations.
To support default values, Jeeves performs simultaneous multiple execution of the program, since
it cannot determine a-priori which of the two facets of a sensitive value (the actual value or the
default) will be used at the time of output. This execution incurs quite a bit of runtime overhead, as
it doubles the number of facets every time the program branches on a sensitive value (for example,
sorting a list of sensitive values causes an exponential blowup). Instead, Lifty infers the eventual
output context statically, and hence is able to pick the appropriate facet at the time of retrieval.
This eliminates runtime overhead, but also makes Lifty conservative in cases where there’s not
enough information about the output context available statically, or when a single sensitive value
is flowing into different contexts that expect different facets. This imprecision can be addressed by
combining static and dynamic techniques, which we leave to future work.
Unpredictable behavior arises in Jeeves because policy predicates are evaluated at run time, and
hence, any reference to a sensitive field inside a policy has to be interpreted as a faceted value, in
order to prevent leaky enforcement. In the case of self-referential policies this leads to unintuitive
fixpoint semantics. For example, if the reviews and the conflicts of a conference submission are
both hidden from a conflicted reviewer u, then at run time, Jeeves would replace conflicts with an
empty list, but reveal the reviews, since u is not a member of conflicts—an empty list, as far as u is
concerned. Lifty does not suffer from this limitation: it interprets all policies literally, and prevents
leaky checks by verifying the generated patches against the policies. In particular, Lifty would
reject a policy as unenforceable if checking this policy causes a leak, while in Jeeves such a policy
would silently default to false.
6.3 Static Information Flow Control
The Lifty type system builds upon a long history of work in language-based information flow
control [Sabelfeld and Myers 2003]. The most closely related work is Fine [Chen et al. 2010;
Swamy et al. 2010] and F∗ [Swamy et al. 2011], which also support value-dependent security
types and use a monadic encoding of information flow. The key difference is that our system uses
(SMT-decidable) predicates as security labels, which supports (1) a direct encoding of Jeeves-style
policies, and (2) fully automatic verification and fault localization, crucial for type-targeted synthesis.
UrFlow [Chlipala 2010] is the only automated verification system that supports a similar flavor of
policies, but it does not provide a sound treatment of self-referential policies. More importantly,
none of these approaches address the issue of or programmer burden: they simply prevent unsafe
programs from compiling, but do not help programmers write policy-enforcing code.
6.4 Type Coercions and Type Error Localization
Our use of type errors to target program rewriting resembles type-directed coercion insertion [Swamy
et al. 2009]; in particular, their coercion insertion and coercion generation mechanisms are similar
to our fault localization and patch synthesis, respectively, and their coercion set is similar to our
set R of redaction functions. The Lifty type system, however, is far more complex than the type
systems explored in that work. In particular, the combination of polymorphism and subtyping
complicates type error localization (since there are many valid type derivations), while refinements
complicate coercion generation (which becomes a refinement type inhabitation problem).
Hybrid type checking [Knowles and Flanagan 2010] can be viewed as coercion insertion for
refinement types. In fact, their coercions also amount to wrapping the original value in a conditional,
however, in their case both the guard and the alternative branch are straightforward.
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Existing work on type error localization for expressive types systems [Loncaric et al. 2016; Seidel
et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2015] is in a more general—yet more forgiving—context of giving feedback to
programmers. Our localization technique (removing constraints that make the system unsatisfiable)
is similar to [Loncaric et al. 2016], but for our specific purpose we have more information to decide
between possible error locations.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes two main contributions. The first one is type-targeted synthesis: a technique for
decomposing the program synthesis problem for a global cross-cutting concern into independent,
local synthesis problems. We believe that this is a promising direction to explore in program
synthesis research: due to scalability limitations, synthesizing large programs from scratch will
likely remain intractable in the near future; hence an important question is how to integrate
synthesized code with hand-written code in a meaningful way. Our work answers this question
for a particular problem domain; in the future we hope to find other domains amenable to such
targeted synthesis.
Our second contribution is a decidable type system for context-dependent policies. With a notable
exception of Jeeves, language-based security literature hasn’t explored the implications of security
policies that directly depend on the sensitive data they protect: how to verify program against such
policies, and what notions of noninterference make sense in this context. In this work, we show
that a refinement type system enables fully automatic checking of context-dependent policies, and
at the same time, gives them more straightforward semantics than the run-time approach of Jeeves.
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A DESUGARING DO-NOTATION
This is code from Fig. 3 with the do-notation desugared into invocations of bind.
showPaper client p =
let row =
bind (get (title p)) ( λ t .
bind (get (status p)) ( λ st .
bind (if st = Accept
then get (session p) else return "") ( λ ses .
return (t + " " + ses))))
print client row
B MICROBENCHMARKS
Below you can find the code for all our microbenchmarks with Lifty-generated patches in gray.
The code has been slightly simplified for readability, and the patches have been re-sugared into do
notation. We use abbreviations: any ≡ λ(s,u).⊤ and none ≡ λ(s,u).⊥.
Benchmark 1 (EDAS) : Show data for paper p to client.
1 phase : : Ref (Tagged Phase <any>)
2 title : : PaperId → Ref (Tagged String <any>)
3 status : : PaperId → Ref (Tagged Status <λ (s,u) . s[phase] = Done}>)
4 session : : PaperId → Ref (Tagged String <any>)
5 redact {NoDecision}
6
7 showPaper client p =
8 let row = do t ← get (title p)
9 st ← do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
10 if c1 then get (status p) else NoDecision
11 ses ← if st = Accept
12 then get (session p)
13 else ""
14 unwords [t, ses] in
15 print client row
Benchmark 2 (EDAS-Multiple) : Same as (EDAS), but multiple terms need to be patched.
1 . . . -- as in EDAS
2 authors : : PaperId → Ref (Tagged [User] <λ (s,u) . s[phase] = Done}>)
3
4 showPaper client p =
5 let row = do t ← get (title p)
6 auts ←do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
7 if c1 then get (authors p) else []
8 st ← do c2 ← do x2 ← get phase; x2 = Done
9 if c2 then get (status p) else NoDecision
10 ses ← if st = Accept
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11 then get (session p)
12 else ""
13 unwords [t, auts, ses] in
14 print client row
Benchmark 3 (EDAS-Self-Ref) : Same as (EDAS-Multiple), but with a self-referential policy on
authors.
1 . . . -- as in EDAS
2 authors : : p: PaperId → Ref (Tagged [User] <λ (s,u) . s[phase] = Done ∨ u in s[authors p]}>)
3
4 showPaper client p =
5 let row = do t ← get (title p)
6 auts ←do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
7 c2 ← ⌊do x2 ← get (authors p); elem client x2⌋
8 if c1 ∨ c2 then get (authors p) else []
9 st ← do c3 ← do x3 ← get phase; x3 = Done
10 if c3 then get (status p) else NoDecision
11 ses ← if st = Accept
12 then get (session p)
13 else ""
14 unwords [t, auts, ses] in
15 print client row
Benchmark 4 (Auction) User bid is fully visible to the user themselves and once the phase is Done;
partially visible to all users who have bid.
1 phase : : Ref (Tagged Phase <any>)
2 bid : : x: User → Ref (Tagged (Maybe
3 (Tagged Int <λ (s,u) . s[phase] = Done ∨ u = x>))
4 <λ (s,u) . s[bid u] , [] ∨ s[phase] = Done ∨ u = x>)
5
6 showBids client =
7 let showParticipant p =
8 do mB ← do c1 ← p = client
9 c2 ← do x2 ← get phase; x2 = Done
10 if c1 ∨ c2
11 then get (bid p)
12 else do c3 ← ⌊do x3 ← get (bid client); isJust x3⌋
13 if c3
14 then do x4 ← get (bid p); mbMap ( λ _ . 0) x4
15 else Nothing
16 maybe "" (liftM show) mB in
17 let out = liftM unlines (mapM showParticipant allParticipants) in
18 print client out
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Benchmark 5 (Auction-Place-Bid) : Place client’s bid and then show them all bids. Check c3 form
previous example is omitted, since we know client has bid.
1 . . . -- as in Auction
2
3 placeBid : : World → User → Int → World
4 placeBid client b =
5 let showParticipant p =
6 do mB ← do c1 ← p = client
7 c2 ← do x2 ← get phase; x2 = Done
8 if c1 ∨ c2
9 then get (bid p)
10 else do x4 ← get (bid p); mbMap ( λ _ . 0) x4
11 maybe "" (liftM show) mB in
12 let out = liftM unlines (mapM showParticipant allParticipants) in
13 let newBid = do mB ← get (bid client)
14 setIfNothing b mB in
15 set (bid client) newBid
16 print client out
17
18 setIfNothing : : Int → Maybe (Tagged Int <p>) → {Maybe (Tagged Int <p>) | just ν}
19 setIfNothing x m = maybe (Just x) Just m
Benchmark 6 (Search) : Show client all their accepted papers. Repairs a leak through a filter.
1 . . . -- as in EDAS-Self-Ref
2
3 showMyAcceptedPapers client =
4 let isMyAccepted p =
5 do auts ← get (authors p)
6 st ← do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
7 if c1 then get (status p) else NoDecision
8 elem client auts ∧ st = Accept in
9 let out =
10 do paperIDs ← filterM isMyAccepted allPaperIDs
11 titles ← mapM ( λ p . get (title p)) paperIDs
12 unlines titles in
13 print client out
Benchmark 7 (Sort) Sort papers by their score, which is hidden from conflicted reviewers. Repairs
a leak through the order of sorted submission. Contains a negative self-referential policy.
1 title : : PaperId → Ref (Tagged String <any>)
2 conflicts : : p: PaperId → Ref (Tagged [User] <λ (s,u) . ¬(u in s[conflicts p])}>)
3 status : : PaperId → Ref (Tagged Status <λ (s,u) . ¬(u in s[conflicts p])}>)
4
5 sortPapersByScore client =
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6 let cmpScore p1 p2 =
7 do x1 ← do c1 ← ⌊do x1 ← get (conflicts p); not (elem client x1)⌋
8 if c1 then get (score p1) else 0
9 x2 ← do c2 ← ⌊do x2 ← get (conflicts p); not (elem client x2)⌋
10 if c2 then get (score p2) else 0
11 return (x1 ≤ x2) in
12 let out = do sortedPids ← sortByM cmpScore allPaperIDs
13 titles ← mapM ( λ p . get (title p)) sortedPids
14 return (unlines titles) in
15 print client out
Benchmark 8 (Broadcast) : Send status notification to authors. Sending message to multiple
viewers, viewers are sensitive.
1 authors : : p: PaperId → Ref (Tagged [User] <λ (s,u) . s[phase] = Done ∨ u in s[authors p]}>)
2 status : : p: PaperId → Ref (Tagged Status <λ (s,u) . s[phase] = Done ∧ u in s[authors p]}>)
3
4 notifyAuthors p =
5 let st = do c1 ← do x1 ← get phase; x1 = Done
6 if c1 then get (status p) else NoDecision in
7 let auts = get (authors p) in
8 printAllauts (liftM show st)
Benchmark 9 (HotCRP) : HotCRP password leak: chair could see other people’s passwords in
message preview.
1 userName : : User → Tagged String <any>
2 userPassword : : x: User → Tagged Password <λ (s,u) . u = x>
3
4 mask : : Tagged Password <none> → Tagged Password <any>
5 redact {mask}
6
7 sendPasswordReminder u .
8 let preview =
9 do name ← get (userName u)
10 pass ← do c1 ← do x1 ← get chair; x1 = u
11 if c1 then get (userPassword u) else mask (get (userPassword u))
12 unwords [name, pass] in
13 let message =
14 do name ← get (userName u)
15 pass ← get (userPassword u)
16 unwords [name, pass] in
17 print (get chair) preview
18 print u message
Benchmark 10 (AirBnB) AirBnB bug: they scrape phone numbers from user messages, but forgot
to do so in the preview. This example features a custom redaction function that makes a message
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text visible to the recipient, but not completely public. It also showcases expressive functional
reasoning with higher-order functions, since correctness depends on the argument of filterM.
1 admin : : Ref (Tagged User <any>)
2 sender : : m: MessageId → Tagged {User | ν , σ[recipient m]} <any>
3 recipient : : m: MessageId → Ref (Tagged {User | ν , σ[sender m]} <any>)
4 text : : m: MessageId → Ref (Tagged String <λ (s,u) . u = s[admin] ∨ u = s[sender m]>)
5 scrapePhoneNumbers : : m: MessageId
6 → Tagged String <λ (s,u) . u = s[admin] ∨ u = s[sender m]>
7 → Tagged String <λ (s,u) . u = s[admin] ∨ u = s[sender m] ∨ u = s[recipient m]>
8 redact {scrapePhoneNumbers}
9
10 viewInbox client =
11 let isMyMessage m =
12 do to ← get (recipient m)
13 to = client in
14 let inbox =
15 do myMIDs ← filterM isMyMessage allMessageIDs
16 messages ← mapM ( λ m .
17 do c1 ← do x1 ← get admin; x1 = u
18 if c1 then get (text m) else scrapePhoneNumbers (get (text m))
19 ) myMIDs
20 unlines messages in
21 print w client inbox
Benchmark 11 (Instagram) : The James Comey Instagram leak: the follow-relationships of private
accounts leak through recommendation algorithms.
1 name : : User → Tagged String <any>
2 isPrivate : : User → Tagged Bool <any>
3 isFollowing : : x: User → y: User → Tagged Bool <λ (s,u) . canSee s u x ∧ canSee s u y>
4 inline isPublic s u = ¬s[isPrivate u]
5 inline canSee s x y = x = y ∨ isPublic s y ∨ s[isFollowing x y]
6
7 follow client newFriend =
8 set (isFollowing client newFriend) true
9 let shouldFollow u =
10 if u = client
11 then false
12 else do c1 ← do x1 ← get (isPrivate u); ¬x1
13 if c1 then get (isFollowing newFriend u) else false in
14 let recommendation =
15 do uids ← filterM shouldFollow allUsers
16 names ← mapM ( λ u . get (name u)) uids
17 unlines names in
18 print client recommendation
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Program Terms
v ::= c | λx . e Values
e ::= v | x | e e | if e then e else e Expressions
| get x | bind e e | ⌊e⌋
s ::= skip | let x = e in s Statements
| set x x ; s | print x x ; s
Types
B ::= Bool | Str | User | ⟨T ⟩π | Ref T Base types
T ::= {B | r } | T → T Types
Refinements
r ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬r | r⊕ Refinement terms
| r [r ] | r [r := r ] | x | r r | · · ·
where ⊕ ∈ {= | ∧ | ∨ |⇒}
π ::= λ(s,u). r Policy predicates
Constants
c ::= true | false
| (. . . boolean and string functions. . . )
| l | u Locations, users
| fieldi Fields
Fig. 12. Syntax of the core language λL .
C THE LANGUAGE λL
C.1 Syntax of λL
The full syntax of λL is given in Fig. 12.
C.2 Operational Semantics of λL
The full operational semantics of λL is given in Fig. 13.
D THE λL TYPE SYSTEM
We show the full typing rules in Fig. 14.
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Expression Evaluation σ , e −→ e
e-β
σ , (λx :T . e) v −→ [x 7→v]e e-get σ , get l −→ σ [l]
e-true
σ , if true then e1 else e2 −→ e1 e-false σ , if false then e1 else e2 −→ e2
e-bind
σ , bind v (λx : T .e) −→ [x 7→ v]e e-downgrade σ , ⌊e⌋ −→ e
e-ctx
e −→ e ′
C[e1] −→ C[e2]
where C ::= • | C e | v C | λx :T . C | get C | if C then e1 else e2
| if v then C else e2 | if v then v1 else Cbind C e | bind v C
Statement Execution σ , s −→ σ , s
let
σ , e −→∗ v
σ , let x = e in S −→ σ , [x 7→ v]S
set
σ , set l v ; S −→ σ [l := v], S print σ , print u v ; S −→ σ [u +=v], S
Fig. 13. λL operational semantics.
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Well-formedness Γ ⊢ r Γ ⊢ B Γ ⊢ S
WF-r
Γ ⊢ r : Bool
Γ ⊢ r WF-Tag
Γ ⊢ T Γ, s : Σ,u : User ⊢ r
Γ ⊢ ⟨T ⟩λ .r
Subtyping Γ ⊢ T <: T ′ Γ ⊢ B <: B′
<:-Sc
Γ ⊢ B <: B′ Γ ⊨ r ⇒ r ′
Γ ⊢ {B | r } <: {B′ | r ′} <:-Fun
Γ ⊢ T ′x <: Tx Γ,x :T ′x ⊢ T <: T ′
Γ ⊢ Tx → T <: T ′x → T ′
<:-Tag1
Γ ⊢ T <: ⟨T ⟩λ .⊤
<:-Tag2
Γ ⊢ T <: T ′ Γ ⊨ r ′ ⇒ r
Γ ⊢ ⟨T ⟩λ .r <: ⟨T ′⟩λ .r ′
<:-Refl
Γ ⊢ B <: B
Expression Typing Γ;σ ⊢ e :: T
T-C
Γ;σ ⊢ c :: ty(c) T-Var
x :T ∈ Γ
Γ;σ ⊢ x :: T T-λ
Γ ⊢ Tx Γ,x : Tx ;σ ⊢ e :: T
Γ;σ ⊢ λx . e :: Tx → T
T-App
Γ;σ ⊢ e1 :: x :Tx → T Γ;σ ⊢ e2 :: Tx
Γ;σ ⊢ e1 e2 :: T [x 7→ e2]
T-get
Γ;σ ⊢ x :: Ref {B | r }
Γ;σ ⊢ get x :: {B | r ∧ ν = σ [x]}
T-If
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: {Bool | r }
Γ, [ν 7→ ⊤]r ⊢ e1 :: T Γ, [ν 7→ ⊥]r ⊢ e2 :: T
Γ;σ ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 :: T T-bind
Γ;σ ⊢ e1 :: ⟨T1⟩π Γ;σ ⊢ e2 :: T1 → ⟨T2⟩π
Γ;σ ⊢ bind e1 e2 :: ⟨T2⟩π
T- ⌊ ·⌋
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: ⟨{Bool | ν ⇒ r }⟩λ(s,u).π [(s,u)]∧r
Γ;σ ⊢ ⌊e⌋ :: ⟨{Bool | ν ⇒ r }⟩π T-<:
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: T ′ Γ ⊢ T ′ <: T
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: T
T∀ Γ,α ;σ ⊢ e :: S
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: ∀α . S T -Inst
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: ∀α . S Γ ⊢ T
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: [α 7→ T ]S
Statement Typing Γ;σ ⊢ s
T-let
Γ;σ ⊢ e :: T Γ,x : T ;σ ⊢ s
Γ;σ ⊢ let x = e in s T-print
Γ;σ ⊢ x1 :: ⟨{User | π [(σ ,ν )]}⟩π
Γ;σ ⊢ x2 :: ⟨Str⟩π Γ;σ ⊢ s
Γ;σ ⊢ print x1 x2 ; s
T-set
Γ;σ ⊢ x1 :: Ref T Γ;σ ⊢ x2 :: T
Γ,σ ′ : {Σ | ν = σ [x1 := x2]} ; σ ′ ⊢ s σ ′ is fresh
Γ;σ ⊢ set x1 x2 ; s T-skip Γ;σ ⊢ skip
Fig. 14. λL static semantics.
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